Harvesting vulnerability: The challenges of organ trafficking in armed conflict
Abstract
Armed conflicts leave populations vulnerable to organ trafficking, a criminal enterprise with little international regulation when viewed separately from human trafficking. The Council of Europe’s Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs is the only instrument to contemplate the responsibility of actors involved in organ trafficking, but traffickers may go unpunished due to its limited scope. Yet in armed conflict, international humanitarian law offers additional protection. The rules protecting the living and the dead against ill-treatment provide the basic level of protection necessary to consider the international responsibility of organ trafficking networks and the individual criminal responsibility of their members.
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References
1 According to the Declaration of Istanbul, travelling for transplantation is not in itself unlawful but becomes transplant tourism if it involves trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal or trafficking in human organs. Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, 2018, p. 2, available at: www.declarationofistanbul.org/ (all internet references were accessed in August 2022).
2 Channing May, Transnational Crime and the Developing World, Global Financial Integrity, Washington, DC, March 2017, pp. xi–xii; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Res. 2327, 31 January 2020.
3 World Medical Association (WMA) General Assembly, “WMA Statement on Measures for the Prevention and Fight Against Transplant-Related Crimes”, Cordoba, 31 October 2020, available at: www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-statement-on-measures-for-the-prevention-and-fight-against-transplant-related-crimes/; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Assessment Toolkit: Trafficking in Persons for the Purposes of Organ Removal, Vienna, 2015 (UNODC Toolkit), p. 10.
4 WMA General Assembly, above note 3; UNODC Toolkit, above note 3, p. 10.
5 See Rudge, C., Delmonico, R. Matesanz, F. L. and Chapman, J., “International Practices of Organ Donation”, British Journal of Anaesthesia, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2012CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
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7 The UNODC recorded twenty-five victims of human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal in 2017, a number which rose to over forty in 2018: UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, Vienna, 2020, p. 36. See Michael Bos, Trafficking in Human Organs, European Parliament, 2015, p. 18; Frederike Ambagtsheer, “Understanding the Challenges to Investigating and Prosecuting Organ Trafficking: A Comparative Analysis of Two Cases”, Trends in Organized Crime, 2021, p. 2; Interpol, Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of Organ Removal in North Africa and West Africa, July 2021, p. 5. See also Heinl, Michael P., Yu, Bo and Wijesekera, Duminda, “A Framework to Reveal Clandestine Organ Trafficking in the Dark Web and Beyond” Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2019, pp. 1–2Google Scholar.
8 Congressional Research Service, International Armed Organ Trafficking: In Brief, 22 December 2021, p. 1, available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46996.pdf; Global Rights Compliance, Do No Harm: Mitigating Human Rights Risks when Interacting with International Medical Institutions and Professionals in Transplantation Medicine, Legal Advisory Report, April 2022, p. 7.
9 C. May, above note 2, p. 29.
10 UNODC Toolkit, above note 3, pp. 11–12; C. May, above note 2, pp. xii, 32–33; Interpol, above note 7, p. 14. See, e.g., UN General Assembly, Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, UN Doc. A/68/256, 2 August 2013, paras 25–30.
11 Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein, The Security Implications of Human Trafficking, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October 2019, p. 8; UNODC, Countering Trafficking in Persons in Conflict Situations, Vienna, 2018, p. 1.
12 Ahmad Haj Hamdo, “The Underbelly of Syria’s War: A Thriving Trade in Human Organs”, UPI, 12 May 2016, available at: www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/05/12/The-underbelly-of-Syrias-war-a-thriving-trade-in-human-organs/5301462896201/.
13 C. May, above note 2, p. 32.
14 Although in the case of IS, organ trafficking may not account for a significant source of funding compared to IS’s other sources, such as extortion and oil theft. See UN General Assembly, Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, UN Doc. A/71/303, 5 August 2016, para. 24; J. Bigio and R. Vogelstein, above note 11, p. 8; C. May, above note 2, p. 33; Annyssa Bellal (ed.), The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2016, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, March 2017, p. 37.
15 International Organization for Migration, Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis, Geneva, 2015, p. 15; Ray Sanchez, “United Nations Investigates Claim of ISIS Organ Theft”, CNN, 19 February 2015, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/18/middleeast/isis-organ-harvesting-claim/index.html; Anne Speckhard, “ISIS Defector Reports on the Sale of Organs Harvested from ISIS-Held ‘Slaves’”, Huffington Post, 1 January 2016, available at: www.huffpost.com/entry/isis-defector-reports-on-sale-of-organs_b_8897708.
16 Warren Strobel, Jonathan Landay and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: Islamic State Sanctioned Organ Harvesting in Document Taken in U.S. Raid”, Reuters, 25 December 2015, available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-islamic-state-documents-idUSKBN0U805R20151225.
17 “Islamic State Accused of ‘Harvesting Organs’”, Sky News, 18 February 2015 available at: https://news.sky.com/story/islamic-state-accused-of-harvesting-organs-10370984; Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, First Responder’s Toolbox: International Partnerships among Public Health, Private Sector, and Law Enforcement Necessary to Mitigate ISIS’s Organ Harvesting for Terrorist Funding, Directorate of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Washington, DC, 11 May 2017, p. 1, available at: www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-how-we-work/joint-ct-assessment-team/first-responder-toolbox.
18 The events reported by the Council of Europe cover the post-conflict period, but there are also allegations that such events occurred during the conflict. See Dick Marty, Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo, Doc. 12462, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 7 January 2011, paras 136, 162, 166. See also Owen Bowcott, “Kosovo Organ Trafficking Inquiry Chief Vows to Investigate All Evidence”, The Guardian, 16 September 2016, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/16/kosovo-organ-trafficking-inquiry-chief-prosecutor-vows-to-investigate-all-evidence.
19 UN General Assembly, above note 14, para. 24; UNSC Res. 2482, 19 July 2019, para. 8. See also UNSC Res. 2462, 28 March 2019; Plachta, Michael, “Transnational Organized Crime and Counterterrorism: Security Council Adopts Resolution on Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism”, International Enforcement Law Reporter, Vol. 35, No. 8, 2019, pp. 309–311Google Scholar.
20 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2225 UNTS 209, 15 November 2000 (entered into force 29 September 2003) (UNTOC).
21 Ibid., Art. 5.
22 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2237 UNTS 319, 15 November 2000 (entered into force 25 December 2003), Art. 3(a).
23 UNODC Toolkit, above note 3, pp. 17–18.
24 See Michael Ramsden, “The International Responsibility of War Profiteers for Trafficking in Persons”, in Nina H. B. Jørgensen (ed.), The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020.
25 UNODC Toolkit, above note 3, p. 17.
26 Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs, CETS No. 2016, 25 March 2015 (entered into force 1 March 2018) (SCC).
27 Pietrobon, Alessandra, “Challenges in Implementing the European Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, p. 486CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
28 SCC, above note 26, Art. 4(1). Article 3 of the SCC states that the Convention applies without discrimination, including on the basis of age, thus granting minors the same protection as adults. However, Article 4(2) permits derogations from Article 4(1) “in exceptional cases and in accordance with appropriate safeguards or consent provisions under its domestic law”.
29 Ibid., Arts. 5–9; A. Pietrobon, above note 27, p. 486.
30 Frederike Ambagtsheer et al., “Cross-Border Quest: The Reality and Legality of Transplant Tourism”, Journal of Transplantation, Vol. 2012, 2012, p. 4.
31 A. Pietrobon, above note 27, p. 486.
32 SCC, above note 26, Art. 10; A. Pietrobon, above note 27, pp. 499–500.
33 See, e.g., Columb, Seán, “Excavating the Organ Trade: An Empirical Study of Organ Trading Networks in Cairo, Egypt”, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 57, No. 6, 2017, p. 1316Google Scholar.
34 See J. Bigio and R. Vogelstein, above note 11, p. 8; F. Ambagtsheer, above note 7, p. 2.
35 Emily Crawford, “The Temporal and Geographic Reach of International Humanitarian Law”, in Ben Saul and Dapo Akande (eds), The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, p. 65.
36 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 71–75; Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2019, paras 6.47–6.53.
37 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber), 10 August 1995, para. 69; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-04, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 2 September 1998, para. 635. See also M. Sassòli, above note 36, para. 6.47; E. Crawford, above note 35, pp. 71–72.
38 The term “in the power of” the adverse party simply requires that a person fall into the hands or be in the territory of the adverse party. See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 1987 (ICRC Commentary on the APs), paras 468–469.
39 See Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Arts 1, 11(1).
40 Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II), Art. 5(1).
41 See ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, paras 470, 4582.
42 The requirement of a link between the deprivation of liberty and the armed conflict excludes “ordinary criminals” prosecuted and detained under normal rules of criminal law from the scope of AP I Article 11 and AP II Article 5. See ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 4568.
43 AP I, Art. 11(1).
44 AP II, Art. 5(2)(e).
45 These standards are neither defined by AP I nor universally codified at the international level and remain scattered across several soft-law instruments such as the WHO Guiding Principles and standards developed by the World Medical Association. Yet, they help to shape a global minimum standard of medical care which may guide the interpretation of “generally accepted medical standards” of IHL. See ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 476.
47 WHO, Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation, WHO/HTP/EHT/CPR/2010.01, 2010, p. 3.
48 See UNODC Toolkit, above note 3, pp. 15–16.
49 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 19 December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR), Art. 7; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Art. 21. On the question of prisoner consent to organ donation, see, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, “Prisoners Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Donate Their Organs”, New York Times, 26 April 2013, available at: www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/25/should-prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs/prisoners-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-donate-their-organs; Norbert W. Paul et al., “Human Rights Violations in Organ Procurement Practice in China”, BMC Medical Ethics, Vol. 18, No. 11, 2017, p. 1; Lainie Friedman Ross and J. Richard Thistlethwaite, “Prisoners as Living Donors: A Vulnerability Analysis”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2018.
50 See ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, paras 468–469, 478.
51 See N. W. Paul et al., above note 49, p. 1.
52 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, paras 475, 482; Eizuke Nakazawa et al., “Will You Give My Kidney Back? Organ Restitution in Living-Related Kidney Transplantation: Ethical Analyses”, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 46, 2020, pp. 144–145.
53 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 486.
54 Ibid., para. 482.
55 Ibid., paras 4588, 4594.
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute), Arts 8(2)(b)(x), 8(2)(e)(ix). AP I, however, does not extend this characterization to a party’s own nationals: see AP I, Art. 11(4).
57 The first successful transplant of a functioning kidney without rejection was in 1954. Henry W. Randle, “The History of Organ Transplantation”, in Clark C. Otley and Thomas Stasko (eds), Skin Disease in Organ Transplantation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 9.
58 The first iteration of this prohibition dates back to the Lieber Code of 24 April 1963. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), p. 321, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1; ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention: Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2020 (ICRC Commentary on GC III), para. 1589.
59 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, Rule 92. p. 320.
60 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 638.
61 See, e.g., International Criminal Court (ICC), Elements of Crimes, adopted by the Assembly of State Parties, First Session, New York, 3–10 September 2002, Official Records ICC-ASP/1/3 (ICC Elements of Crimes), Art. 8(2)(b)(x)-1.
62 Rome Statute, above note 56, Arts 8(2)(b)(x), 8(2)(e)(ix). See also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UNSC Res. 955, 8 November 1994 (last amended 13 October 2006), Art. 4; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UNSC Res. 1315, 14 August 2000, Art. 3.
63 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 643; ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 479; ICC Elements of Crimes, above note 61, Arts 8(2)(c)(i)-2, 8(2)(b)(x)-1 fn. 46, 8(2)(e)(xi)-1 fn. 69.
64 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III); Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV).
65 See AP I, Arts 4, 73.
66 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II).
67 See ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), paras 1397–1399.
68 Ibid., para. 1399.
69 AP I, Art. 9; ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 460.
70 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 3037.
71 Ibid., paras 3024, 3027–3028; Marina Mancini, “Content and Customary Nature of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I”, in Fausto Pocar and Gian Luca Beruto (eds), The Additional Protocols 40 Years Later: New Conflicts, New Actors, New Perspectives, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Milan, 2018, p. 86.
72 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 2926; Knut Dörmann, “The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 849, 2003, p. 67.
73 ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 3011; M. Mancini, above note 71, p. 85.
74 See, e.g., GC III, Art. 3(1)(a); ICTY, Tadić, above note 37, para. 69; ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, paras 552–553.
75 AP II, Arts 4(1), 4(2)(a); ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, paras 4515, 4520.
76 Hors de combat covers anyone who (1) is in the power of an adverse party, (2) is defenceless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sickness, or (3) has expressed an intention to surrender and abstains from any hostile acts or escape attempts. ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 164.
77 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 580.
78 AP II, Art. 4(1).
79 See M. Sassòli, above note 36, paras 6.80–6.84.
80 Ibid., paras 6.80–6.84.
81 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 28 February 2005, paras 560–561; ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-1962, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 June 2017, para. 65.
82 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 581.
83 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-309, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Bosco Ntaganda (Pre-Trial Chamber), 9 June 2014, para. 79. See also Cóman Kelly and Yvonne McDermott, “The Expanding Protection of Members of a Party’s Own Armed Forces under International Criminal Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2019, p. 947.
84 See, e.g., ICCPR, above note 49, Art. 6(1).
85 Samuel G. Walker, “Lawful Murder: Unnecessary Killing in the Law of War”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2012, pp. 418–419.
86 GC I, Art. 50; GC II, Art. 51; GC III, Art. 130; AP I, Arts 41(1), 85(3)(e); Rome Statute, above note 56, Arts 8(2)(b)(vi), 8(2)(c)(i).
87 GC IV, Art. 147; AP I, Arts 51(2–3), 85(3)(a); Rome Statute, above note 56, Arts 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i).
88 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 218.
89 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 164–170, 313–314.
90 See C. May, above note 2, p. 32; N. W. Paul et al., above note 49; Matthew P. Robertson and Jacob Lavee, “Execution by Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China”, American Journal of Transplantation, Vol. 22, No. 7, 2022; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: UN Human Rights Experts Alarmed by ‘Organ Harvesting’ Allegations”, 14 June 2021, available at: https://tinyurl.com/ycksme4k.
91 Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, Judgment, 1 March 2020, available at: https://chinatribunal.com/final-judgment/.
92 See ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 403–404.
93 Ibid., p. 403.
94 ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 67, para. 1499.
95 AP I, Art. 17; GC I, Art. 18. In NIACs, this protection is effected by the fundamental guarantees given to persons hors de combat.
96 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 404–405.
97 Commentary on GC III, above note 58, paras 647, 1600.
98 There is, however, an increasing recognition of this obligation by parties in NIACs: see ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 411–412. See also Anna Petrig, “The War Dead and Their Gravesites”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, 2009, pp. 343–344.
99 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 406, 409, 414, 417.
100 See GC I, Art. 15(1); GC II, Art. 18(1); GC IV, Art. 16(2); AP I, Arts 32, 33; AP II, Art. 8; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 406–408.
101 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 407.
102 Ibid.
103 See ibid., p. 408; Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. 4: Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1958 (ICRC Commentary on GC IV), p. 136.
104 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 408; A. Petrig, above note 98, p. 346.
105 See GC I, Art. 15(1); GC II, Art. 18(1).
106 GC IV, Art. 16(2); AP I, Arts 33(1), 33(4); AP II, Art. 8; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 406–408.
107 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 407; ICRC Commentary on GC IV, above note 103, p. 135; ICRC Commentary on the APs, above note 38, para. 1280.
108 See GC I, Art. 15; GC II, Art. 18; GC IV, Art. 16; AP II, Art. 8.
109 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 409–411.
110 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 647.
111 See, e.g., ICTR, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence (Trial Chamber), 16 May 2003, para. 303; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 16 November 1998, para. 849.
112 Rome Statute, above note 56, Arts 8(2)(b)(xxi), 8(2)(c)(ii); ICC Elements of Crimes, above note 61, Arts 8(2)(b)(xxi) fn. 49, 8(2)(c)(ii) fn. 57.
113 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, Rule 113, p. 409.
114 See GC I, Art. 15; GC II, Art. 18(1); GC IV, Art. 16(2); AP I, Art. 34(1); AP II, Art. 8.
115 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 409.
116 Ibid., pp. 185, 409.
117 See, e.g., B. Björkman and S. O. Hansson, “Bodily Rights and Property Rights”, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006; Jesse Wall, “The Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2011; Carlo Petrini, “Ethical and Legal Considerations Regarding the Ownership and Commercial Use of Human Biological Materials and Their Derivatives”, Journal of Blood Medicine, Vol. 3, 2012.
118 Interpol, above note 7, p. 8. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “The Ends of the Body: Commodity Fetishism and the Global Traffic in Organs”, SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002, p. 62.
119 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, para. 431.
120 See ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 67, para. 1487.
121 With over 190 States Parties, the UNTOC has attracted near-universal participation. Cecily Rose, “The Creation of a Review Mechanism for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 114, No. 1, 2020, p. 51.
122 UNTOC, above note 20, Art. 2(a).
123 UNODC, Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries, Vienna, September 2002 (UNODC Survey), pp. 15–18; Jay S. Albanese, “Transnational Organized Crime”, in Mangai Natarajan (ed.), International Crime and Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 233–234.
124 UNODC Survey, above note 123, pp. 34–37.
125 Ibid., pp. 37–39.
126 C. May, above note 2, p. xii.
127 UNODC Survey, above note 123, p. 39. See also Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks”, in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, pp. 72–74.
128 UNODC Survey, above note 123, p. 39.
129 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
130 Ibid., p. 41.
131 Ibid.
132 UNTOC, above note 20, Art. 2(c).
133 UNODC Survey, above note 123, p. 5.
134 Ibid., p. 39; G. Vermeulen, Y. Van Damme and Wendy De Bondt, “Perceived Involvement of “Organised Crime” in Human Trafficking and Smuggling”, International Review of Penal Law, Vol. 81, No. 1–2, 2010, p. 256.
135 UNODC, Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiation for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, New York, 2006, p. 15.
136 Pierre Hauck and Sven Peterke, “Organized Crime and Gang Violence in National and International Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 878, 2010, p. 422; UNODC, Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol Thereto, New York, 2004, p. 13, para. 26.
137 M. Bos, above note 7, pp. 20–21; C. May, above note 2, p. 31; M. P. Heinl, B. Yu and D. Wijesekera, above note 7, pp. 3–4; Interpol, above note 7, p. 13. See also S. Columb, above note 33, pp. 1307–1308.
138 C. May, above note 2, p. 31; M. Bos, above note 7, pp. 20–21.
139 C, May, above note 2, p. 31; M. Bos, above note 7, pp. 20–21. See, e.g., F. Ambagtsheer, above note 7, p. 7 (discussing the Netcare and Medicus cases, which both exposed global organ trafficking networks of brokers, recruiters, and health-care professionals and facilities).
140 M. Bos, above note 7, p. 20.
141 See A. Pietrobon, above note 27, p. 486; C. May, above note 2, p. 31.
142 See UNTOC, above note 20, Art. 11(6).
143 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion to Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 70.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 See ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, paras 481–485.
147 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008, para. 60. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Trial Chamber), 21 March 2016, para. 134.
148 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 463; ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper, Geneva, 2008, p. 3. See also Jelena Pejic, “Status of Armed Conflicts”, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 85–86; Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle Kilibarda, “Counterterrorism and the Risk of Over-Classification of Situations of Violence”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 103, No. 916–917, 2021, p. 215.
149 See AP II, Art. 1. However, AP II does not apply to NIACs occurring between non-State armed groups only. ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined?, above note 148, p. 4.
150 See Peter Margulies and Matthew Sinnot, “Crossing Borders to Target Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates: Defining Networks as Organized Armed Groups in Non-International Armed Conflicts”, in Terry D. Gill et al. (eds), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2013, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2015, p. 337.
151 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 30 November 2005, paras 131–133.
152 Fiona Terry and Brian McQuinn, The Roots of Restraint in War, ICRC, Geneva, 2018, pp. 38, 46.
153 Ibid., pp. 46–47.
154 See G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, p. 220; P. Margulies and M. Sinnot, above note 150, p. 337.
155 G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, pp. 217–218; Eurojust, Cumulative Prosecution of Foreign Terrorist Fighters for Core International Crimes and Terrorism-Related Offences, The Hague, 2020, p. 10; Tom Gal, “Legal Classification of the Conflict(s) in Syria”, in Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms and Sareta Ashraph (eds), The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 49–50; Agnes Callamard, “Towards International Human Rights Law Applied to Armed Groups”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2010, pp. 87–90.
156 G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, pp. 219–220.
158 See P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 433.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid. IHL is therefore traditionally concerned with “[a]ll armed groups capable of launching operations with some semblance of a military character”. See Daniel Muñoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, ICRC, Geneva, 2020, p. 13.
161 G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, p. 235.
162 Similarly, although gangs and drug cartels might receive military training and weapons and engage in open violence against the State or a rival in order to maintain their influence and territory, their ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations is questionable. P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 432.
163 See M. Bos, above note 7, p. 25; Statis N. Kalyvas, “How Civil Wars Help Explain Organized Crime – and How They Do Not”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, No. 8, 2015, p. 1520. However, organized criminality is not always motivated by profit. For instance, gangs in El Salvador maintain a “criminal subsistence economy” which supports their activities, without generating major profit revenue. Kirsten Ortega Ryan, “‘Urban Killing Fields:’ International Humanitarian Law, Gang Violence, and Armed Conflict on the Streets of El Salvador”, International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2020, p. 116.
164 See P. Williams, above note 127, p. 71.
165 P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 432.
166 Ibid., p. 433.
167 G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, p. 234.
168 Ibid., p. 221.
169 ICTY, Haradinaj, above note 147, para. 49. See also ICC, Bemba, above note 147, para. 137.
170 Rome Statute, above note 56, Art. 8(f). See also AP II, Art. 1(2).
171 See P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 431; G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, pp. 221–223, 234; ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined?, above note 148, p. 3.
172 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 190; G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, pp. 220–224.
173 P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 431. In the case of El Salvador, it has been argued that widespread gang violence and its effects on the civilian population has met the threshold of protracted armed violence. See K. Ortega Ryan, above note 163, pp. 107–114.
174 Eurojust, above note 155, p. 7. See Carina Bergal, “The Mexican Drug War: The Case for Non-International Armed Conflict Classification”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2011, p. 1084. But see Andrea Nill Sanchez, “Mexico’s Drug “War”: Drawing a Line between Rhetoric and Reality”, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2013, pp. 468, 491.
175 Interpol, above note 7, p. 30; P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 431.
176 C. May, above note 2, para. 32.
177 Emilio C. Viano, “Unholy Alliances and Their Threat: The Convergence of Terrorism, Organized Crime and Corruption”, International Annals of Criminology, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2020, p. 92. See, generally, Laura Adal, Organized Crime in the Levant: Conflict, Transactional Relationships and Identity Dynamics, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Geneva, 2021. It was estimated in 2016 that IS had raised up to $2 billion worth of assets, through smuggling, extortion and the seizure of oil fields: A. Bellal (ed.), above note 14, p. 37.
178 See Regina Menachery Paulose, “Towards a New Framework in the Law of War: Incorporating Transnational Organised Crime”, University of Western Sydney Law Review, No. 17, 2013, p. 70.
179 M. Sassòli, above note 36, para. 6.61.
180 See, e.g., GC IV, Art. 2.
181 See also Sven Peterke and Joachim Wolf, “International Humanitarian Law and Transnational Organised Crime”, in Pierre Hauck and Sven Peterke (eds), International Law and Transnational Organised Crime, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, pp. 383–390.
182 See P. Hauck and S. Peterke, above note 136, p. 422.
183 See Julie Gaudreau, “The Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 849, 2003, p. 147; Dapo Akande, “Classification of Armed Conflict”, in Ben Saul and Dapo Akande (eds), The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, p. 39. See also S. Peterke and J. Wolf, above note 181, pp. 383–390.
184 D. Akande, above note 183, pp. 44–47. See also Djemila Carron, “When Is a Conflict International? Time for New Control Tests in IHL”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 98, No. 903, 2016.
185 ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, para. 406.
186 This position is shared by the ICRC: Tristan Ferraro, “The ICRC’s Legal Position on the Notion of Armed Conflict Involving Foreign Intervention and on Determining the IHL Applicable to This Type of Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 900, 2016, p. 1238. See, generally, Rogier Bartels, “The Classification of Armed Conflicts by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals”, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2020.
187 ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, para. 404; D. Akande, above note 183, p. 47.
188 M. Sassòli, above note 36, paras 6.67–6.71; Ezequiel Heffes and Brian E. Frenkel, “The International Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups: In Search of the Applicable Rules”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017, pp. 46–55.
189 Jann K. Kleffner, “The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 882, 2011, p. 450.
190 For instance, the Taliban has generated revenue by taxing entities involved in the production, manufacture and trafficking of illicit opiates in Afghanistan. In 2016, non-State armed groups raised around $150 million from that illicit trade. UNODC, The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism, Vienna, 2017, p. 10; E. C. Viano, above note 177, p. 92.
191 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 86, para. 118.
192 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, pp. 497–498, 536.
193 ILC, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2001 (ARSIWA).
194 ICRC Commentary on GC III, above note 58, para. 931; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 536; E. Heffes and B. E. Frenkel, above note 188, pp. 57–59; Katharine Fortin and Jann K. Kleffner, “Responsibility of Organized Armed Groups Controlling Territory: Attributing Conduct to ISIS: Liber Amicorum Terry D. Gill”, in Rogier Bartels et al. (eds), Military Operations and the Notion of Control under International Law, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2020, p. 314. See, generally, Kirsten Schmalenbach, “International Responsibility for Humanitarian Law Violations by Armed Groups”, in Heike Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.
195 ARSIWA, above note 193, Art. 10, p. 50; K. Schmalenbach, above note 194, p. 503; Marco Sassòli, “Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2010, p. 9.
196 This can be done by drawing on the characteristics shared by non-State armed groups and States: K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, pp. 318–325.
197 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, p. 550; Olivia Herman, “Beyond the State of Play: Establishing a Duty of Non-State Armed Groups to Provide Reparations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020, p. 1037.
198 See AP I, Art. 91; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, Rule 150, p. 537; Luke Moffett, “Violence and Repair: The Practice and Challenges of Non-State Armed Groups in Engaging in Reparations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020, p. 1062.
199 See W. Strobel, J. Landay and P. Stewart, above note 16.
200 K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, pp. 324–325; Laura Íñigo Álvarez, Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law, Intersentia, Cambridge, Antwerp and Chicago, IL, 2020, p. 71.
201 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 88, para. 109; ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, paras 392–393; K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, p. 320.
202 ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, paras 384, 392–393. See Marko Milanović, “State Responsibility for Acts of Non-State Actors: A Comment on Griebel and Plücken”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009, pp. 316–317; Vladyslav Lanovoy, “The Use of Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits of Attribution of Conduct”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2017, p. 575.
203 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 88, para. 110; ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, paras 394–395; V. Lanovoy, above note 202, p. 575.
204 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ notably considered that approving the organization’s name and selecting and paying its leaders, as well as “the organization, training and equipping of the force, the planning of operations, the choosing of targets and the operational support provided”, was not sufficient to prove complete dependency. In the Genocide case, the ICJ could not find complete dependence where the non-State actor had “some qualified, but real, margin of independence”. See ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 88, paras 111–112; ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, para. 394.
205 K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, pp. 322–323.
206 See ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 88, para. 115; ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, paras 399–400; Antonio Cassese, “The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007, pp. 650, 653.
207 See K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, p. 321.
208 M. Bos, above note 7, p. 21; Interpol, above note 7, p. 13. See K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, p. 321; K. Schmalenbach, above note 194, p. 500.
209 See K. Schmalenbach, above note 194, pp. 499–500.
210 See ICJ, Genocide, above note 119, para. 406; A. Cassese, above note 206, p. 657.
211 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, para. 137.
212 Ibid., paras 120, 131, 137.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid., paras 131, 137.
215 Ibid., para. 137.
216 See ICTY, Limaj, above note 151, paras 131–133; G. Gaggioli and P. Kilibarda, above note 148, pp. 217–218.
217 See ARSIWA, above note 193, p. 53; K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, p. 323.
218 See W. Strobel, J. Landay and P. Stewart, above note 16.
219 ARSIWA, above note 193, p. 53.
220 See K. Fortin and J. K. Kleffner, above note 194, p. 324.
221 Ibid.
222 Rome Statute, above note 56, Art. 75(2).
223 See ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 58, Rule 3, p. 11.
224 Ibid., p. 573; Robert Cryer, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, p. 275. See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 29 November 2002, paras 57–60.
225 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 8 July 2019, para. 731; Cassese, Antonio, “The Nexus Requirement for War Crimes”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 10, No. 5, 2012, pp. 1395, 1397CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
226 Ibid. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 293.
227 See, generally, ICC Elements of Crimes, above note 61. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 12 June 2002, paras 57–59.
228 ICTY, Ntaganda, above note 225, para. 731; ICTY, Kunarac, above note 227, para. 58.
229 ICTY, Ntaganda, above note 225, para. 732. See also ICTY, Kunarac, above note 227, para. 59; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 26 May 2003, para. 570.
230 See the above section on “Organ Trafficking Networks as Parties to a NIAC”.
231 See Steenkamp, Christina, “The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in Syria”, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2017, p. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
232 United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, The Medical Trial, Judgment, 1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 2, 1950, p. 186.
233 ICTY, Kunarac, above note 227, para. 58.
234 See van der Wilt, Harmen, “War Crimes and the Requirement of a Nexus with an Armed Conflict”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 10, No. 5, 2012, p. 1125CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
235 ICTR, Rutaganda, above note 229, para. 570; Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 44; H. van der Wilt, above note 234, pp. 1125, 1127; Fortin, K., “The Application of Human Rights Law to Everyday Civilian Life under Rebel Control”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 63, 2016, p. 176CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Gaggioli, Gloria, “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, No. 894, 2014, p. 516CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
236 ICTR, Rutaganda, above note 229, para. 570.
237 ICTY, Kunarac, above note 227, para. 59; ICTR, Rutaganda, above note 229, para. 569. See A. Cassese, above note 225, pp. 1397, 1413.
238 UN General Assembly, above note 14, para. 24; UNSC Res. 2482, 19 July 2019, para. 8.
239 ICC, Ntaganda, above note 81, paras 23–24. See, e.g., GC III, Art. 13; GC IV, Art. 32.
240 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, above note 38, para. 493.
241 See the above section on “The Prohibition of Organ Harvesting under IHL”.
242 Rome Statute, above note 56. See Global Rights Compliance, above note 8, pp. 29–30.
243 See Rome Statute, above note 56, Art. 25(3)(b); Interpol, above note 7, pp. 13–14.
244 See M. Ramsden, above note 24, p. 249.
245 Ibid., pp. 248–251.
EYES ON TRAFFICKING
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EYES ON TRAFFICKING
This “Eyes on Trafficking” story is reprinted from its original online location.
ABOUT PBJ LEARNING
PBJ Learning is a leading provider of online human trafficking training, focusing on awareness and prevention education. Their interactive Human Trafficking Essentials online course is used worldwide to educate professionals and individuals how to recognize human trafficking and how to respond to potential victims. Learn on any web browser (even your mobile phone) at any time.
More stories like this can be found in your PBJ Learning Knowledge Vault.